INTRODUCTION
The division between nature and society is one of the basic principles of modernity. This constitution, Bruno Latour calls it the "Great Divide", divides reality into two poles that are incommensurable: a desocialised nature (nature is true, nature is out there) and a denaturalised society (society is constructed by humans). Like this, nature and society have been separated and purified. In his work, Latour aims to reveal that the modern separation is artificial. Because reality is at the same time real (like nature), narrated (like discourse), and collective (like society), Latour does not follow the clean divisions envisioned by modernism. Yet despite his claim "we have never been modern" (1995) there are numerous attempts going on to uphold or to re-establish the nature-society-divide. Manifest and stable divisions between the two realms are a precondition of the functioning of many institutions and routines in modern society. To the extent that the divide has become blurred, we can discern efforts to counter this development by re-erecting or newly defining boundaries. The way in which this is done is at the centre of this paper. I particularly focus on the narrations (or myths) residing on the side of nature, i.e. on the naturalisms employed to re-establish order.
This paper draws on a case study of the German agricultural sector. For a long time, agricultural history has been a success story. The sector's development can be summarised as a continuous growth in efficiency, productivity, and average farm size. Industrialisation and its leitmotif of "modern agriculture" was accompanied by the belief in the control and mastery of nature. It brought about lots of beneficial developments, e.g. food safety, alleviation of work done by farmers, overcoming of natural forces, and so on. Yet nature may get out of control. This was the case with BSE, the acronym standing for "bovine spongiform encephalopathy", also known as "mad cow disease", a neurodegenerative disease of cattle that has attracted wide attention because it is thought to be the cause of new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, a human brain-wasting disease. BSE can be seen as a consequence of nature being economised and literally devoured by society. Human metabolism with nature resulted in evolutions that did beat back on society and, like that, challenged the divide between nature and society. As a consequence, the BSE-crisis triggered a dispute about the future development of farming and agricultural policy. As we will see, this debate is characterised by efforts to re-establish the nature-society-divide in order to cope with the crisis. The result however is a pluralisation of definitions of the demarcation line and it remains to be seen whether this serves the purpose of restoring the modern order.
A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN GERMANY
At the end of 2000, the BSE crisis sent the German agricultural system into turmoil. On November 24 th , the first case of BSE-infected cattle was detected in Schleswig-Holstein and brought the tale of Germany as a "BSE-free country" to a sudden end. Two weeks later, three more cases of BSE surfaced in Bavaria. It then became clear that the infections were no individual cases. The German agricultural minister had long insisted that his country had no problem with BSE and that all necessary measures were put in place to avoid the disease spread to Germany. The cases of BSE-infected cattle, however, belied the ministers' claims. Over night, policies and personnel were exchanged. In the course of the BSE-events a new agricultural approach was proclaimed. Thereby, the long phase of German agricultural policy that developed more or less unnoticed from the public and granted numerous privileges to the agricultural sector came to an end. Profound conflicts between the agricultural lobby and other stakeholders like consumers and environmentalists emerged that revolved around fundamental questions of "good" agriculture. The BSE-crisis put the whole agrarian sector in a state of flux.
The BSE-crisis
BSE was not only a German problem, however, and it has been an explosive issue long before the turn of the year 2000/01, too. In Britain, evidence for a novel cattle disease was already found in the mid1980s that was puzzling. Where did it come from? How many cattle will catch it? Is there any therapy or prevention? And the most terrifying question: Will it be transmittable and will it affect humans? Scientists were confronted with profound ignorance towards the odd disease. The initial assumption that it was a mutation of the sheep disease "scrapie" turned out to be wrong. In 1987, scientists identified it as a new prion disease, a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy. By that time, the incidence rate was already running at 30-40 cases per month (Dressel 2002: 65-67) . For fear of a hysterical reaction of the population and the collapse of the British beef market, the risk was swept under the carpet. BSE appeared to be the potential third food scandal in a row -after salmonella and listeria, both bacterial contaminations of food -that shattered public confidence in the 1980s (ibid.: 67-68). Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) chose to take a low profile approach towards BSE. Scientific research was controlled and restricted to the laboratories inside the ministry. Other researchers were prevented from doing any work on BSE, e.g. through MAFF's legal ownership over all BSE material (ibid.: 73). The problem was however not resolved by patronising or simply ignoring it. Also, the campaign of agriculture minister John Gummer who publicly ate hamburgers with his daughter Cordelia to quell fears about British beef was only a limited success (Döring 2002: 29) . Quite the contrary, the situation aggravated the more the government tried to ignore the disease because no precautionary action was taken.
As BSE developed rapidly throughout the whole country, the British government eventually sprang into action. In 1988, a "ruminant feed ban" was introduced that prohibited the feeding of rations containing animal protein, derived from ruminants, to cattle. It took however years before the feed ban worked well since the government did not withdraw the feed that had already been put on the market. More importantly, the incubation period is very long and new cases of BSE-infected cattle born in the period after the feed ban occurred (Dressel 2002: 78-79) . In November 1989, only 15 month after the feed ban, the government introduced the "specified offals ban" that prohibited the use of bovine brain and spinal cord in meat products. The decree was announced as a mere precautionary measure for public health (ibid.: 96). However, public critique started to swell despite the British government again and again reciting its mantra "beef is safe". Suspicion rose strongly when in 1990 "Mad Max" surfaced, the first domestic cat that showed clear symptoms of a spongiform encephalopathy. The agent did jump the species barrier -by BSE infected pet food. Subsequently, the numbers of species infected by food or experimentally increased. These cases gave evidence that BSE is a transmissible disease that might also spread to humans. By that time, the numbers of BSEinfected cattle born after the feed ban were dramatic: By spring 1993, 2,157 cases of BSE had been Stephen Churchill, Britain's first known teenage victim of the new brain disorder who died in May 1995, went through the press. Scientists saw these cases of vCJD as related to BSE. Thus, the species barrier that had been claimed to shield humans from the "animal disease" BSE proved to be an illusion. According to the CJD Surveillance Unit in Edinburgh, the number of deaths from definite or probable vCJD in the UK amounts to a total of 154 up to now (CJD Surveillance Unit 2006), and nobody knows how many people might be incubating the agent.
The first known cases of vCJD in 1996 were followed by a world-wide ban on the export of British cattle and cattle products (e.g. in the EU under Commission Decision 96/239/EC). By that time, the Germans considered themselves as "free of BSE". The most vital measure in German regulatory policy therefore was to ensure that no infective material could pass the German border.
Besides the general ban of British cattle, the government introduced control measures according to which any import of beef or bovine products from any EU country or third state had to be certified by an official veterinarian. The agricultural ministry stated repeatedly that consumers can be completely confident about eating German beef. Nevertheless, further precautionary measures were implemented that appeared to be motivated purely politically. In January 1997, for example, the BSE-case of an imported cow resulted in the decision to kill all 5,200 cattle that originated from the UK and Switzerland (Dressel 2002: 151) . In the end, all precautionary action should prove to be vain, however. When the first BSE-infected cow born in Germany was discovered on November 24 th , 2000, this was considered the worst case scenario.
Only six days later, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, in a speech in front of the German parliament, proclaimed an "agricultural policy of a new kind". "The BSE-scandal denotes the end of the old agricultural policy. We see the whole sector in shambles" (Künast 2001 : 1, my translation). The new policy was framed as a fundamental turn in agricultural policies ("Agrarwende") with priority given to sustainable production, consumer concerns and food safety (Feindt/Ratschow 2003: 4-7) . With this political focus, the government for the first time headed for confrontation with the German agricultural lobby.
The conflict on "good" agriculture
Until 2001, the German agricultural sector was characterised by clientelistic politics. Agrarian policies were made "by farmers for farmers" (Gerlach et al. 2005: 3) . For example, between 1949 and 2000 all ministers, with only one minor exception, had a personal history in the agricultural sector (due to family ties, education or professional background) (Feindt et al. 2005: 12) . The agricultural lobby was well organised, and its flagship, the German Farmers Union maintained close relationships with the ministry. The effectiveness of this arrangement was buttressed by the low public profile of agricultural issues. The political structures were complex with major stimuli coming from the European level. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), established in 1962 on the basis of the Treaty of Rome, focussed on the "increase [of] agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the factors of production" (Art. 33, EC Treaty). The CAP guaranteed the European farmers minimum prices for their products, e.g. through intervention purchases. In the late 1970s, these support measures encouraged massive overproduction and ever increasing quantities of butter, grain and other farm products. During the 1980s, the EC therefore introduced a number of measures to control production, e.g. milk quota and programmes for set-aside of agricultural land. Since 1992, the CAP is undergoing major reforms with the overall aim of adjusting it to market requirements, i.e. the liberalisation of policies, although some accompanying measures for environmental and other quality standards have been introduced as well. However, the loss of agricultural subsidies has de facto been absorbed by a rededication of the payments as direct income to the farmers (Henrichsmeyer/Witzke 1994: 561-68; Ribbe 2001: 33) . In sum, the CAP has promoted a rapid growth of the agricultural sector over the years, with high rates of productivity, intensive agriculture, increasing mechanisation and increasing average farm size. These developments long remained unquestioned. The "grow or go" approach ("Wachsen oder Weichen") that left the farmers with the choice either to expand their business continuously or to go out of business was taken for granted. At the same time, society was prepared to back the farmers with subventions from tax money since the farmers were regarded to perform an important task in society:
food production -a constellation that was described as "agripolitical consensus" (Hagedorn/Schmitt 1985: 268) .
This consensus broke down in the course of the BSE-crisis. Agricultural policy and production methods now came under fire. Intensive agriculture, mass food production, damage to the environment and maltreatment of farm animals -all together emblematised as "agricultural factories" -were identified as the negative outcome of a narrow-minded productivist philosophy. Concomitantly, the image of agriculture as carried out by family farms that produce good and healthy food turned out to be a chimera. People felt betrayed and uncertain about food safety (Ratschow 2003: 92-93) . These issues were put on the political agenda by the German government. In order to address the problems and to restore consumer confidence the new minister Künast proclaimed a "turnaround" in agricultural policy and a precautionary approach to consumer protection (vorsorgender Verbraucherschutz). The agricultural policy field broadened in that the former closed political circles were opened to societal demands -a change that was also exposed by the ministry's change of name (consumer protection was put at first). Under the new policy, numerous measures were taken among which the promotion of ecological farming and animal welfare were seen as the most influential ones. Organic farming, in particular, epitomised the new agricultural policy approach. The ambitious target was to increase the organic farming sector to 20 per cent by 2010 (BMVEL 2001: 9) . Organic farming was considered the production method that best addressed the safety and quality problems of food production as well as the environmental problems of modern agriculture. Therefore, it was coined as an alternative model for the whole agricultural sector. "Klasse statt Masse", roughly meaning: quality instead of mass production, became the shortcut for the novel approach. Its most visible measure to promote ecological farming was the introduction of an eco-label for organically grown food to further the sale of such products (Feindt/Ratschow 2003: 14-15) .
The reaction of the agricultural lobby followed without delay. Protest was directed against the government policy driving a wedge between "good" and "bad" farmers. The minister was accused to criminalising thousands and thousands of farmers who grow their products conventionally and do observe the standards of environmental protection and animal welfare. By no means, the critics argued, organic farming was proven to be superior to conventional agriculture. The Agrarwendeprogramme rather represented a biased policy that one-sidedly privileged a particular production method. Therefore, it was deemed the ideologisation of agricultural policy. The agricultural lobby demanded to acknowledge the economic realities that the farmers encounter. The target of agricultural policy should be to increase the farmers capacity to compete on the world market. National regulations on animal welfare and environmental protection (sometimes even exceeding EU standards) that impact on the competitiveness of the German farmers were regarded unacceptable. "We need the economy to be able to afford the ecology", said the president of the German Farmers Association Gerd Sonnleitner Concurrently, it was maintained that modern agriculture makes a contribution to the goals of environmental and animal protection. Here, the Farmers Association employed the concept of "multifunctional agriculture" according to which agriculture serves several functions in addition to its primary role of food and fibre production. These additional functions include the sectors' contribution to land conservation, the maintenance of agricultural landscapes and agribiological diversity, the viability of rural areas, cultural heritage, among others (Heissenhuber/Lippert 2000) . The agricultural organisations were however split on the environmental issue. The so called "agricultural opposition" (Agraropposition), consisting of peasant groups, organic farmers, nature and environmental conservationists, grass-roots initiatives etc., adopted a critical attitude towards agricultural policy and common farming practices. Their aim was to promote a sustainable development of agriculture that takes environmental issues, animal rights and consumers' concerns into account (Ratschow 2003: 46-49 ). Yet the influence of this wing of the agri-organisational landscape remained small. The mainstream lobby groups maintained the farmers' clean agricultural record and the sectors' positive contribution to many societal goals.
Overall, we can discern two opposing camps: On the one hand, the mainstream of the agricultural lobby stressing the key role of agriculture and its important contribution to society. They claimed that the farmers took this responsibility into account in their work. On the other hand, the government, along with large parts of society, emphasising the importance of environmental, animal and consumer protection. It was argued that, above all, agriculture should subscribe to these goals. The underlying conflict on "good" agriculture might long have been latent, presumably since the emergence of the environmental movement during the 1960s and 70s that questioned the traditional orientation in agriculture towards growth and efficiency at least implicitly (Hagedorn 1996: 49) . However, the conflict now became manifest in the BSE-crisis.
NATURE IN CRISIS
Having outlined the events of the BSE-crisis with particular focus on the German developments, I
shall subsequently unfold my thesis that reads the story as a process of de-naturalisation and renaturalisation. According to Bruno Latour (1995) , the "Great Divide" between nature and society is one of the basic principles of modernity. Many institutions in modern society -like the economy, medicine, the education system etc. -are based on this division. It serves as a legitimation for, amongst others, the exploitation of nature through the economy, the differentiation between health and illness in medicine, the focus on capabilities in meritocratic education systems or the justification of social inequality, which is often based on differences of race, sex or other "natural" features. The nature-society-divide, as a criterion for differentiation, provides societal actors and institutions with orientation (Viehöver et al. 2004: 65; Lau/Keller 2001: 83-84 ). Since the 1960s or so, the division has become increasingly blurred, problematic and dysfunctional. There were various reasons for this development, particularly the growing technical-scientific interventions in natural complexities.
Nature became more and more socialised and, as a consequence, increasing parts of nature were made socio-instrumentally available. More importantly, though, it became clear that the nature-societydivide is not an inherent quality that lies in the "nature of things" but is a contingent and contested social convention. Several theorists have described this process as transformation of the first towards the second (or reflexive) modernity (Beck 1986 (Beck , 1993 Beck/Bonß 2001) .
Irrespective of such meta-change, it is more interesting in our context to study how these social processes emerged and developed. In the following sections, I shall trace how the nature-societydivide was challenged in the course of the BSE-crisis and how the societal actors reacted in order to cope with the crisis. As we will see, their response has been to attempt to re-establish the division between nature and society. Government as well as the agricultural lobby used a strategy of naturalisation of their arguments. In so doing, they both employed the ambivalences of the naturesociety-relationship for strategic purposes with the aim to relocate or to newly define the boundary in line with their own ideas and interests. The analysis aims to scrutinise the discourse politics during the BSE-crisis.
Disintegration of nature
The development of the agricultural sector was largely based on the process of industrialisation, characterised by the modern belief in the ever increasing control and mastery of nature. An important precondition for this development was the systematic scientification of agriculture beginning in the mid-19 th century. This was made possible through the inclusion of knowledge from chemistry and biology that facilitated the invention of mineral fertilisers and pesticides, amongst others. The chemisation of agriculture began to replace traditional agrarian practices and also changed the relation with animals and plants. In animal husbandry, for example, production targets were defined for different animals so that meat production and dairy farming could be optimised. The expansion of animal manufacturing has to be seen against the background of an emerging market for animal products as a result of the industrialisation process and population growth. Moreover, the development of a technical infrastructure (refrigerator and transport technology) helped on the evolution of such market. Further differentiation of the agricultural sector triggered the emergence of an animal feed market and, eventually, this opened the condition of the possibility of the BSE-crisis (Böschen et al.
2003: 42).
In the beginning of the BSE-crisis, ignorance about its origin, the nature of the agent and the route of transmission prevailed. One of the main hypotheses was that BSE is caused by feed of scrapie infected meat and bone-meal (MBM). However, sheep and cattle transmissible spongiform encephalopathy are quite different and it was later considered more likely that BSE originated with a case of sporadic BSE in a single bovine. In Britain, the practice of using MBM, obtained from the remnants of butchered animals, for feed has already been prevalent for decades and has allowed the accumulation of prions over many generations. As more animals became ill, more infectious tissue got into the feed and eventually the number of cases reached epidemic proportions. Another factor contributed to this development. By the end of the 1970s, there was a major restructuring of the rendering process, in which meat and bone meal, fat and tallow are produced. The UK changed its rendering process to a less rigorous practice that allowed a lower temperature sterilisation of protein meal. While other EU member states like Germany required animal by-products to undergo a high temperature steam boiling process, this requirement was eased in Britain as a measure to keep prices competitive. MBM, consisting of recycled sheep and cattle, was promoted as high-protein feeding stuff for high-yield varieties of cattle. It came to be seen as a cheap protein alternative in place of the more expensive soya bean feed. Subsequent changes in animal feeding practices resulted in an increase of the infectious agents in the cattle feed and further contributed to the epidemic.
Consequently, BSE appeared to be a British problem for several years (Dressel 2002: 76-77) .
At that time, Germany was considered as free of BSE. This claim was based upon the fact that it was not usual agricultural practice to feed MBM to ruminants here. In addition, the change of practice in the UK rendering plants regarding the production of MBM was never followed by the German industry (Dressel 2002: 136) . The first case of BSE-infected cattle born in Germany therefore gave rise to speculations about alternative ways of infection. There was some evidence suggesting that BSE can be transmitted from a cow to its offspring but, today, we know that only 5-10 per cent of calves of diseased cows do carry the agent. The most likely way of transmission is the feeding of calf milk replacers that substituted whole milk feeding. The long incubation period however makes it difficult to draw reliable conclusions. At present, it is only assured that the spongiform encephalopathy is spread by animal feed from infected MBM. BSE is thus a result of a feeding practice that transformed herbivores into carnivores (and indeed cannibals). This developed from the industrialisation of animal production that broadened the rage of feeding stuff to the point to include animal content as a protein supplement (Böschen et al. 2003: 42) . However, cows do not eat dead sheep. This basic peasant knowledge was suspended in modern agriculture and, in the end, this resulted in crisis when the side effects of the feeding practice became visible.
The divide between nature and society was challenged in the course of the BSE-crisis. The crisis came to be seen as a non-intended consequence of an economic practice and thus of human decisions and actions. Knowledge about what is deemed "natural" became blurred, and as side effects mounted the distinction between nature and society faded. The attribution of responsibilities for these developments impinged on the institutions that were designed to provide safety. Their legitimation declined to the extent that they had to admit to act in the face of uncertainty and ambivalence. As a consequence, it was attempted to restore safety with new forms of boundary lines, for example through the distinction between so called separator meat, i.e. meat peeled off the bones mechanically that might contain bone fragments (risky) and meat without direct contact to central nerve tissue (safe), between British (risky) and continental meat (safe), and even between Bavarian (risky) and German cattle (safe). However, these attempts all the more increased the delegitimation of the institutions and routines that were supposed to guarantee safety. Consumer trust seemed irrecoverable, and politicians, veterinaries, the Farmers Association and other guardians of safety, welfare and stability came under constant suspicion to play down and blur the perils or even to create new ones (Kropp/Wagner 2005: 169) . The rising uncertainty is exemplified by a study (conducted during the BSE-crisis after the ruminant feed ban) that investigated the harmlessness of calf feeding with milk from the mother cow. It had to be proven that, from a scientific perspective, there is no evidence against nature. Industrial feeding practice has been the norm for a long time so that the natural feeding had to be approved by a scientific study (Schmidt/Jasper 2001: 36) .
Nature reconstructed
The ambivalence of the boundary between nature and society triggered not only a functional crisis of the institutions and actors involved but also impinged on their legitimation. As a consequence, they attempted to redefine the objects and practices regarding what was deemed "natural" and what was not. It is interesting to note that this was quite an active endeavour. The actors took advantage of the rising ambivalences and attempted to newly define the boundary between nature and society according to their own normative and material interests. Hence, they strategically employed the ambivalences.
The BSE-crisis provoked numerous debates about agricultural practices and raised questions about what "good" agriculture should be. In our study, agriculture represents the interface between nature and society, and it is revealing to scrutinise how the boundary between nature and society was removed here. We can discern how the actors tried to define the boundary in a way that qualified their ideas about agriculture as "natural". Their strategy was thus one of a naturalisation of arguments, which served as a legitimising ground. The way in which the actors formulated their naturalisms was however very different. In the German case, we already identified two opposing camps in the agricultural conflict during the BSE-crisis: the German government, with the green minister Künast on the one hand, and the agricultural lobby on the other hand. Let us now take a look at their argumentative strategies.
In the course of the BSE-crisis, the government seized the opportunity to introduce a new programme for the development of the agricultural sector that emphasised environmental, consumer and animal protection. The novel approach was above all embodied in organic farming. This was the production method considered to best address the safety and quality problems of food production as well as the environmental problems of modern agriculture. It was coined as alternative vision for the whole agricultural sector. Organic farming is a form of agriculture that relies on ecosystem management that involves fostering natural processes and a holistic approach. It attempts to reduce or eliminate external agricultural inputs, especially synthetic ones, such as synthetic fertilisers and pesticides as well as genetically modified organisms. It emphasises management practices taking into account that regional conditions require locally adapted systems. Organic farming often relies on relatively small-scale production units and independent operations. This is ideally represented in family farming, i.e. a farm operated by a family and passed down from generation to generation. Here human beings live and work in accordance with nature and produce good and healthy food.
In that the German government oriented its agricultural approach towards organic farming, reference was made to a way of "natural" agriculture. This touched a raw nerve of modern society where most people are more or less alienated from nature and the countryside. They idealise the country life as a way of meaningful living, which stands in sharp contrast to their urban lives with no direct relation to the natural environment (where, for example, food and other agricultural products stem from the supermarket) (Lorenzl/Brandt 1995: 17) . In a marvellous essay Karl Brandt (1961) portrays the longing for nature as "paradise lost complex". Modern society romanticises the farm life as "happy valley where life is imagined as […] simple, safe, harmonious, and peaceful" (ibid.: 86).
The author goes on to depict the farm as the origin of society and all civilisation: "Indeed, it is an incontestable historical fact that, outside the Garden of Eden, the cradle of all civilizations was the farm" (ibid.). On this basis, organic farming could be idealised as natural and authentic way of living, working and producing. At the same time, it represented a counter-model directed against the so called agricultural factories as epitome of industrial agriculture that was held responsible for the BSE-crisis.
From a more structural point of view, there were other reasons for the legitimatory power of the government policy, too. The promotion of organic farming was by no means an uncontested vision supported all-over. It was directed at the urban dwellers, not at those living in the countryside. It was furthermore directed at those maintaining a modern, progressive, technically oriented and comfortable lifestyle with a distance towards the natural environment. The nostalgia of natural living could appeal only to this subgroup. Most particularly, the programme was designed for the highly educated, leftist urbanites with an assured income (being able to afford organic products) that represent the Green Party's and to some extent also the Social Democratic electorates (the parties of the then government).
In this sense, the government's agricultural policy was far from being "natural" (and therefore acceptable all-over) but directed at a particular clientele (von Alvensleben 2003: 1).
The second group of actors in the German agricultural conflict was the mainstream agricultural lobby. In the period after the Second World War, the development of the sector was dominated by closed political circles and strong protectionist policies. The rationale for this was the key role of agriculture and its important contribution to society. It is interesting to note that the policy was based on a naturalism as well: the entelechy of agricultural production, according to which the agrarian sector is characterised by the immobility of production factors and the dependency on natural conditions (and therefore needs protection) (Hagedorn 1996: 207-210 ). This position is also referred to as "agricultural fundamentalism". Protectionist policies did however not affect the industrial development path and the rapid economic growth of the sector. Reference to nature rather served as a strong legitimation for agricultural politics and, as a side effect, contributed to the political and cultural closure of the sector. The dissociation of farming processes from (agriculturally alienated) society further added to the unhampered development of the sector. This way, the societal image of the agricultural sector was ruled by idyllic images of peasant living and working (like those that were tried to be restored after the BSE-crisis). The agricultural lobby was long able to instrumentalise these myths despite the fact that they increasingly conflicted with the industrial reality of agricultural production (Rieger 1995: 38) .
The BSE-crisis destabilised this well-established arrangement. The about-turn in German agricultural policy was perceived as an attack on the whole sector. The reform was criticised for being ideological and a backlash towards unrealistic, out-dated farming practices. The developments of the sector during the past decades -mechanisation, technisation, and rationalisation of farm management -have eased the farmers' hard physical work significantly. At the same time, the world has change a lot. Today, the farmers encounter international agricultural markets and increasing competition.
Agricultural policies should therefore increase the farmers' capacity to compete on the world market.
Excessive national regulations on environmental protection and animal welfare affecting the farmers' competitiveness were regarded unacceptable. What is more, they were deemed unnecessary. It was claimed that the farmers were aware of their responsibility towards the natural resources, like soil, water, air, animals and plants, and that they took this responsibility into account in their work (DBV 2001) . Here, the agricultural lobby tried to (re-)establish a particular responsibility of the agricultural sector towards societal goods. It was argued that the whole society benefits from agriculture, i.e. from good food and other products. Like this, the old contract with society (the so called "agricultural consensus") was evoked (Hagedorn 1996: 432-33) . And again, this was based on agri-fundamentalist arguments about the distinctiveness of the agrarian sector due to its dependence on natural conditions.
The concept now employed for justification was "multifunctional agriculture". Agriculture serves several functions besides it primary role of food production, namely land conservation, the maintenance of agricultural landscapes, the viability of rural areas etc. It was thus maintained that modern agriculture contributes not only to securing food supply but also to enhancing the quality of life which, today, is closely connected with the goals of environmental and animal protection.
In terms of definition of the nature-society-divide the strategy of the agricultural lobby was to include the current agricultural practices within the realm of nature. Based on agri-fundamentalist ideology and adapted theories about the societal contribution of agriculture they attempted to legitimise their ideas of "good" agriculture. That way, the BSE-epidemic was framed as an unfortunate accident or the work of some irresponsible characters, not as a structural problem of modern agriculture. The lobby groups thereby defended themselves against the reform policy promoted by the German government. However, their naturalisation strategy also served another purpose, i.e.
coherence within the agricultural sector. Sweeping structural changes resulting from rapid economic development of the sector has created not only winners but also many losers. In particular the small farmers were at a disadvantage. Time and again, this meant a challenge to the organisational basis of the agricultural lobby organisations. Hence, fundamentalist arguments about the peculiarities of the sector, employed to secure protectionist policies, also served to uphold coherence and a collective identity among the farmers (Hagedorn 1996: 442) .
Overall, in the conflicts on the nature-society-relationship that occurred during the BSE-crisis none of the actors involved -neither the government nor the agricultural lobby -had an interest to remove the polarity between nature and society. Rather this was seen as a window of opportunity for programmatic renewal, i.e. to adjust the boundary according to their own goals and interests. The analysis revealed in which ways the naturalistic argumentations can be understood as discursive politics. By way of conclusion, I shall elaborate on the ambivalent connection between nature and politics.
CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF NATURE AND THE NATURE OF POWER
Whereas social facts are constituted by human decisions that need to be justified, nature, in contrast, follows its own rules. Natural facts release us from decisions and justifications. In modern society, however, growing knowledge about natural complexities and increasing technical-scientific interventions into natural complexities colonised this realm. As a result, nature became more and more socialised and thus a part of society. The BSE-crisis is an example of such socialisation when the epidemic came to be seen as a consequence of industrial agriculture and thus of societal practices.
Thereby, the boundary between nature and society was blurred. At the same time, it was attempted to uphold the "Great Divide" since it is the precondition of the functioning of many institutions and routines in modern society. The nature-society-divide is a criterion for differentiation, which provides societal actors and institutions with orientation. As a result, the ideology of nature is on the rise. In times of ambivalence and uncertainty, nomothetic claims about the nature of human beings and society, about things that are valid forever "by nature" play a vital role.
Our study of the strategies with which the actors tried to cope with the crisis revealed how quick they were to rebuild the boundary between nature and society. In their argumentations, both actor groups made reference to naturalisms. They relied on the "power of nature" as a legitimising ground for their narratives. This was done, however, in order to pursue their respective goals and interests and with a view on their particular target groups. Hence, from an analytical perspective, we deal with two myths that both claim to be true. This allows us to relate them to their respective context and the (power) conditions under which they occur and flourish. I therefore argue that it is in the "nature of power" that the actors took advantage of the ambivalences of the BSE-crisis and attempted to newly define the nature-society-divide. Yet this strategy works only when the argumentations are compelling, that is when reference to nature generates legitimation and brings political disputes to an end. The resulting pluralisation of definitions of the demarcation line was counterproductive, though.
Like that, the one true ("natural") narration could not be substantiated. It is questionable therefore that the restoration of order will be successful. In the end, Bruno Latour might be right claiming that we have never been modern. At least, we are not at this point.
